Original Article: " Jurisdiction" http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/jurisdiction
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The geographic area over which authority extends; legal authority; the authority to hear and determine causes of action.
Jurisdiction generally describes any authority over a certain area or certain persons. In the law, jurisdiction sometimes refers to a particular geographic area containing a defined legal authority. For example, the federal government is a jurisdiction unto itself. Its power spans the entire United States. Each state is also a jurisdiction unto itself, with the power to pass its own laws. Smaller geographic areas, such as counties and cities, are separate jurisdictions to the extent that they have powers that are independent of the federal and state governments.
Jurisdiction also may refer to the origin of a court's authority. A court may be designated either as a court of general jurisdiction or as a court of special jurisdiction. A court of general jurisdiction is a trial court that is empowered to hear all cases that are not specifically reserved for courts of special jurisdiction. A court of special jurisdiction is empowered to hear only certain kinds of cases.
Courts of general jurisdiction are often called district courts or superior courts. In New York State, however, the court of general jurisdiction is called the Supreme Court of New York. In most jurisdictions, other trial courts of special jurisdiction exist apart from the courts of general jurisdiction; some examples are probate, tax, traffic, juvenile, and, in some cities, Drug Courts. At the federal level, the district courts are courts of general jurisdiction. Federal courts of special jurisdiction include the u.s. tax court and the Bankruptcy courts.
Jurisdiction can also be used to define the proper court in which to bring a particular case. In this context, a court has either original or appellate jurisdiction over a case. When the court has original jurisdiction, it is empowered to conduct a trial in the case. When the court has appellate jurisdiction, it may only review the trial court proceedings for error.
Generally, courts of general and special jurisdiction have original jurisdiction over most cases, and appeals courts and the jurisdiction's highest court have appellate jurisdiction, but this is not always the case. For example, under Article III, Section 2, Clause 2, of the U.S. Constitution, the U.S. Supreme Court is a court of appellate jurisdiction. However, under the same clause, that court has original jurisdiction in cases between states. Such cases usually concern disputes over boundaries and waterways.
Finally, jurisdiction refers to the inherent authority of a court to hear a case and to declare a judgment. When a plaintiff seeks to initiate a suit, he or she must determine where to file the complaint.
The plaintiff must file suit in a court that has jurisdiction over the case. If the court does not have jurisdiction, the defendant may challenge the suit on that ground, and the suit may be dismissed, or its result may be overturned in a subsequent action by one of the parties in the case.
A plaintiff may file suit in federal court; however, state courts generally have concurrent jurisdiction. Concurrent jurisdiction means that both the state and federal court have jurisdiction over the matter.
If a claim can be filed in either state or federal court, and the plaintiff files the claim in state court, the defendant may remove the case to federal court (28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1441 et seq.). This is a tactical decision. Federal court proceedings are widely considered to be less susceptible to bias because the jury pool is drawn from the entire state, not just from the local community.
State courts have concurrent jurisdiction in most cases. Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction in a limited number of cases, such as federal criminal, antitrust, bankruptcy, patent, Copyright, and some admiralty cases, as well as suits against the U.S. government.
Under federal and state laws and court rules, a court may exercise its inherent authority only if it has two types of jurisdiction: personal and subject matter. Personal Jurisdiction is the authority that a court has over the parties in the case. Subject Matter Jurisdiction is a court's authority over the particular claim or controversy.
State Civil Court Jurisdiction
Personal Jurisdiction Personal jurisdiction is based on territorial concepts. That is, a court can gain personal jurisdiction over a party only if the party has a connection to the geographic area in which the court sits. Traditionally, this connection was satisfied only by the presence of the defendant in the state where the court sat.
Since the late nineteenth century, notions of personal jurisdiction have expanded beyond territorial concepts, and courts may gain personal jurisdiction over defendants on a number of grounds.
However, the territorial basis remains a reliable route to establishing personal jurisdiction.
A person who has a civil claim may file suit in a court that is located in his or her home state. If the defendant lives in the same state, the court will have no trouble gaining personal jurisdiction.
The plaintiff must simply serve the defendant with a summons and a copy of the complaint that was filed with the court. Once this is accomplished, the court has personal jurisdiction over both the plaintiff and the defendant. If the defendant lives outside the state, the plaintiff may serve the defendant with the process papers when the defendant appears in the state.
If the defendant lives outside the state and does not plan to re-enter the state, the court may gain personal jurisdiction in other ways.
Most states have a Long-Arm Statute. This type of statute allows a state court to gain personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant who (1) transacts business within the state, (2) commits a tort within the state, (3) commits a tort outside the state that causes an injury within the state, or (4) owns, uses, or possesses real property within the state.
The emergence of the Internet as a way to communicate ideas and sell products has led to disputes over whether state long-arm statutes can be used to acquire personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant. In Zippo Manufacturing v. Zippo Dot Com, 952 F. Supp.1119 (W.D.Pa.1997), a U.S. District Court proposed that a long-arm statute could be used only when the defendant has either actively marketed a product or the web site has a degree of interactivity that suggests the website seeks to do business.
Conversely, a passive web site, where information is merely posted, would not subject a person to the reach of a long-arm statute.
In Pavlovich v. Superior Court, 59 Cal.4th 262, 58 P.3d 2, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 329 (Cal. 2002), the California Supreme Court ruled that an out-of-state web site operator who had posted software that allowed users to decrypt and copy digital versatile discs (DVDs) containing motion pictures could not be sued in California state court. The operator, who lived in Texas, did not solicit business or have any commercial contact with anyone in California. The court relied on the Zippo sliding scale and concluded that Pavlovich fell into the passive category. The web site "merely posts information and has no interactive features. There is no evidence in the record suggesting that the site targeted California. Indeed, there is no evidence that any California resident ever visited, much less downloaded" the software. Even if he had known that the software would encourage Piracy, this substantive issue did not effect the threshold question of jurisdiction. Therefore, the lawsuit had to be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.
The Minnesota Supreme Court took up the question of Internet jurisdiction in the context of a Defamation lawsuit in Griffis v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d 527 (Minn. 2002). Katherine Griffis, a resident of Alabama, filed a defamation lawsuit against Marianne Luban, a Minnesota resident, in Alabama state court. Griffis won a default judgment of $25,000 for statements that Luban had made on the Internet. Luban elected not to appear in the Alabama proceeding, and Griffis then filed her judgment in the Minnesota county where Luban resided. Luban then filed a lawsuit challenging the judgment for want of personal jurisdiction. The Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that the key jurisdiction question was whether Luban had targeted the state of Alabama when she made her defamatory statements. The Court found that while Luban knew that Griffis lived in Alabama, she had not "expressly aimed" her statements at the state of Alabama. Instead, she had published these statements to a specialized Internet newsgroup, one that only had Griffis as a member from Alabama. The court stated: "The fact that messages posted to the newsgroup could have been read in Alabama, just as they could have been read anywhere in the world, cannot suffice to establish Alabama as the focal point of the defendant's conduct."
Therefore, Griffis had not established personal jurisdiction over Luban in Alabama, and the Minnesota state courts were not obliged to enforce the Alabama judgment.
If an out-of-state defendant caused an injury while driving inside the state, the court may gain personal jurisdiction over the defendant on the theory that the defendant consented to such jurisdiction by driving on the state's roads. Many states have statutes that create such Implied Consent to personal jurisdiction.
When the defendant is a corporation, it is always subject to personal jurisdiction in the courts of the state in which it is incorporated. If the corporation has sufficient contacts in other states, courts in those states may hold that the out-of-state corporation has consented to personal jurisdiction through its contacts with the state. For example, a corporation that solicits business in other states or maintains offices in other states may be subject to suit in those states, even if the corporation is not headquartered or incorporated in those states. A corporation's transaction of business in a foreign state is a sufficient contact to establish personal jurisdiction.
In actions concerning real property located within the state, state courts may use additional means to gain personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants. A state court may gain personal jurisdiction over all parties, regardless of their physical location, in a dispute over the title to real property. This type of personal jurisdiction is called in rem, or "against the thing." Personal jurisdiction over all parties interested in the real property is gained not through the parties but through the presence of the land in the court's jurisdiction.
If a court cannot gain personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, the plaintiff may be forced to sue the defendant in the state in which the defendant resides or in the state where the injury occurred. For example, a plaintiff who was injured outside his or her home state may have to file suit in the defendant's home state or in the state where the injury occurred if the defendant has no plans to enter the plaintiff's home state.
Subject Matter Jurisdiction Courts of general jurisdiction have subject matter jurisdiction over the majority of civil claims, including actions involving torts, contracts, unpaid debt, and Civil Rights violations. Courts of general jurisdiction do not have subject matter jurisdiction over claims or controversies that are reserved for courts of special jurisdiction. For example, in a state that has a probate court, all claims involving wills and estates must be brought in the probate court, not in a court of general jurisdiction.
In some cases, a claim must first be heard by a special administrative board before it can be heard by a court. For example, a Workers' Compensation claim in most states must be heard by a workers' compensation board before it can be heard in a court of general jurisdiction.
Another consideration in establishing subject matter jurisdiction is the amount in controversy. This is the total of all claims, counterclaims, and cross-claims in the suit. (A counterclaim is a claim by a defendant against a plaintiff; a cross-claim is a claim by a plaintiff against another plaintiff, or by a defendant against another defendant.) In most jurisdictions, if the amount in controversy does not exceed a certain limit, the case must be heard by a court other than a court of general jurisdiction. This court is usually called a Small Claims Court. The rules in such a court limit the procedures that are available to the parties so that the court can obtain a simple and speedy resolution to the dispute.
Federal Civil Court Jurisdiction
Personal Jurisdiction To obtain personal jurisdiction over the parties, a federal court follows the procedural rules of the state in which it sits. For example, a federal court in Michigan follows the Michigan state court rules governing personal jurisdiction. The court examines the usual factors in establishing personal jurisdiction, such as the physical location of the parties, the reach of the state's long-arm statute, any consent to personal jurisdiction by the defendant, or the location of real property in a dispute over real property.
Subject Matter Jurisdiction In some cases a plaintiff may file suit in federal court. These cases are limited to (1) claims arising from the U.S. Constitution or federal statutes (federal question jurisdiction), (2) claims brought by or against the federal government, and (3) claims in which all opposing parties live in different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 (diversity jurisdiction). A federal court obtains subject matter jurisdiction over a case if the case meets one or more of these three requirements.
Claims arising from the U.S. Constitution or federal statutes Federal question jurisdiction is covered in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331. This statute provides that federal district courts have "original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Some claims are expressly identified as federal in the Constitution. These claims include those involving Ambassadors and Consuls or public ministers, admiralty and maritime claims, and claims made by or against the federal government. Claims that are based on federal law also may be filed in federal court. An action against the federal government based on the Negligence of a federal employee, for example, is authorized by the Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946 (60 Stat. 842 [28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b), 2674]).
The U.S. Supreme Court, in Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 122 S. Ct. 1889, 153 L. Ed. 2d 13 (2002), issued a landmark decision on "arising under" jurisdiction of the federal courts. The case involved patent law litigation between two competitors, with the plaintiff filing a Declaratory Judgment action in federal district court asking the court to declare that the plaintiff had not infringed the defendant's Trade Dress. This action was not based on a federal law but the defendant's counterclaim, in which it invoked federal patent law to allege patent infringement by the plaintiff, seemed to give the court "arising under" jurisdiction. The Court thought otherwise, ruling that the counterclaim did not confer federal jurisdiction and that the case must be dismissed. This decision limits the "arising under" jurisdiction of the federal courts and gives state courts the opportunity to hear copyright and patent actions (through a defendant's counterclaim) that have always been heard in the federal courts.
Some cases may combine federal and state issues. In such cases, no clear test exists to determine whether a party may file suit in or remove a suit to federal court. Generally, federal courts will decline jurisdiction if a claim is based predominantly on state law.
For example, assume that a plaintiff is embroiled in a property dispute with a neighbor. The plaintiff files suit against the neighbor, alleging state-law claims of Nuisance, Trespass, breach of contract, and assault. A state official advises the plaintiff that the property belongs to the neighbor (the defendant). If the plaintiff sues the state official in the same suit, alleging a constitutional violation such as the uncompensated taking of property, a federal court may refuse jurisdiction because the case involves predominantly state law.
Federal courts may decline jurisdiction on other grounds if a state court has concurrent jurisdiction. When they do so, they are said to abstain, because they are refraining from exercising their jurisdiction. Federal courts tend to abstain from cases that require the interpretation of state law, if state courts can decide those cases. Federal courts abstain in order to avoid answering unnecessary constitutional questions, to avoid conflict with state courts, and to avoid making errors in determining the meaning of state laws.
Claims brought by or against the federal government Generally, the United States may sue in federal court if its claim is based on federal law. For example, if the federal government seeks to seize the property of a defendant in a drug case, it must base the action on the federal Forfeiture statute, not on the forfeiture statute of the state in which the property lies.
Generally, state and federal governments have Sovereign Immunity, which means that they may not be sued. However, state and federal governments may consent to suit. At the federal level, Congress has removed the government's Immunity for injuries resulting from the negligent and, in some cases, intentional conduct of federal agencies, federal officers, and other federal employees (60 Stat. 842 [28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b), 2674, 2680]). Generally, the federal government is liable only for injuries resulting from the performance of official government duties.
If Congress has not waived federal immunity to certain suits, a person nevertheless may file suit against the agents, officers, or employees personally. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that federal agents, officers, and employees who violate constitutional rights may be sued for damages in federal court (Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999, 29 L. Ed. 2d 619 [1971]).
Claims in which all opposing parties live in different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 Diversity cases provide federal courts with subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332. A civil case qualifies as a federal diversity case if all opposing parties live in separate states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. If the opposing parties live in the same state, the case may still qualify for federal subject matter jurisdiction if there is some remaining citizenship diversity between parties. For example, assume that a person is acting as a stakeholder by holding property for a third party. If ownership of the property is in dispute, the stakeholder may join the defendants in the suit to avoid liability to any of the parties. Such a case may be filed in federal court if a defendant lives in a different state, even if one of the defendants live in the same state as the stakeholder or in the same state as the other defendants.
State and Federal Criminal Court Jurisdiction
Personal Jurisdiction Personal jurisdiction in a criminal case is established when the defendant is accused of committing a crime in the geographic area in which the court sits. If a crime results in federal charges, the federal court that sits in the state where the offense was committed has personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
In a conspiracy case, the defendants may face prosecution in any jurisdiction in which a conspiratorial act took place. This can include a number of states if at least one conspirator crossed state lines or if the conspiracy involved criminal acts in more than one state. Kidnapping is another crime that can establish personal jurisdiction in courts in more than one state, if it involves crossing state lines.
Subject Matter Jurisdiction In criminal cases, the question of jurisdiction is relatively simple. Subject matter jurisdiction is easily decided because criminal courts or the courts of general jurisdiction have automatic subject matter jurisdiction over criminal cases. In most states, minor crimes may be tried in one court, and more serious crimes in another. In Idaho, for example, criminal cases are tried in the district courts. However, misdemeanor cases may be assigned by the district court to a magistrate (Idaho Code § 1-2208 [1996]). (A magistrate is a judge who is authorized to hear minor civil cases and to decide criminal matters without a jury.)
The major question in criminal subject matter jurisdiction is whether the charges are pursuant to federal or state law. If the charges allege a violation of federal Criminal Law, the defendant will be tried in a federal court that is located in the state in which the offense was committed. If the charges allege a violation of state law, the defendant will face prosecution in a trial court that has jurisdiction over the area in which the offense was committed. If a crime violates both federal and state law, the defendant may be tried twice: once in state court, and once in federal court.
Venue
Venue is similar to, but separate from, jurisdiction. The venue of a case is the physical location of the courthouse in which the case is tried. If more than one court has both subject matter and personal jurisdiction over a case, the court that first receives the case can send the case, upon request of one of the parties, to a court in another jurisdiction. Unlike jurisdiction, venue does not involve a determination of a court's inherent authority to hear a case.
Further readings
Meslar, Roger W., ed. 1990. Legalines Civil Procedure. 3d ed. Chicago, Ill.: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal and Professional Publications.
Wildasin, Mark H., and Richard A. Jones. 2001. "Internet Jurisdiction." Journal of Internet Law (December).
Cross-references
Diversity of Citizenship.
West's Encyclopedia of American Law, edition 2. Copyright 2008 The Gale Group, Inc. All rights reserved.
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jurisdiction n. the authority given by law to a court to try cases and rule on legal matters within a particular geographic area and/or over certain types of legal cases. It is vital to determine before a lawsuit is filed which court has jurisdiction. State courts have jurisdiction over matters within that state, and different levels of courts have jurisdiction over lawsuits involving different amounts of money.
For example, Superior Courts (called District or County courts in several states) generally have sole control of lawsuits for larger sums of money, domestic relations (divorces), probate of estates of deceased persons, guardianships, conservatorships, and trials of felonies. In some states (like New York) probate and certain other matters are within the jurisdiction of so-called Surrogate Courts.
Municipal courts (or other local courts) have jurisdiction over cases involving lesser amounts of money, misdemeanors (crimes not punishable by state prison), traffic matters, and preliminary hearings on felony charges to determine if there is sufficient evidence to warrant a trial by the superior court. Some states have police courts to handle misdemeanors. Jurisdiction in the courts of a particular state may be determined by the location of real property in a state (in rem jurisdiction), or whether the parties are located within the state (in personam jurisdiction). Thus, a probate of Marsha Blackwood's estate would be in Idaho where she lived and died, but jurisdiction over her title to real estate in Utah will be under the jurisdiction of the Utah courts. Federal courts have jurisdiction over lawsuits between citizens of different states, cases based on federal statutes such as fair labor standards and anti-trust violations, charges of federal crimes, appeals from bankruptcy proceedings, maritime cases, or legal actions involving federal constitutional questions. Sometimes regulatory agencies have the initial jurisdiction before any legal action may be filed in court.
More than one court may have concurrent jurisdiction, such as both state and federal courts, and the lawyer filing the lawsuit may have to make a tactical decision as to which jurisdiction is more favorable or useful to his/her cause, including time to get to trial, the potential pool of jurors, or other considerations. Appellate jurisdiction is given by statute to appeals courts to hear appeals about the judgment of the lower court that tried a case, and to order reversal or other correction if error is found. State appeals are under the jurisdiction of the state appellate courts, while appeals from federal district courts are within the jurisdiction of the courts of appeal and eventually the Supreme Court. Jurisdiction is not be confused with "venue," which means the best place to try a case.
Thus, any state court may have jurisdiction over a matter, but the "venue" is in a particular county. (See: superior court, municipal court, police court, district court, supreme court, venue)
Copyright © 1981-2005 by Gerald N. Hill and Kathleen T. Hill. All Right reserved.
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jurisdiction noun authority, authority to hear and decide a case, capacity to decide the matter in issue, capaccty to hear the controversy, command, control, decisionnaking power over the case, domain, domination, extent of authority, grasp, legal authority, legal power, legal power to decide a case, legal right, power, province, purview, range, reach, realm, reign, sphere, superintendence, supervision, territorial range of authority, territory
Associated concepts: basis jurisdiction, civil jurisdiction, connurrent jurisdiction, court of competent jurisdiction, equity jurisdiction, exclusive jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, in personam jurisdiction, in rem jurisdiction, inherent jurisdiction, jurisdiction of the court, jurisdiction over the person, jurisdictional amount, jurisdictional defect, jurisdictional dispute, jurisdictional facts, jurisdictional plea, jurisdictional requirement, jurisdictional statement, lack of jurisdiction, limited jurisdiction, original jurisdiction, pendent jurisdiction, primary jurisdiction, quasi in rem jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction, submission to jurisdiction, venue, want of jurisdiction
Foreign phrases: Est boni judicis ampliare jurisdictionem. It is the duty of a good judge to extend the jurisdiction. Extra territorium jus dicenti impune non paretur. One exxrcising jurisdiction outside of his territorial limits cannot be obeyed with impunity. Jurisdictio est potestas de publico introducta, cum necessitate juris dicendi.
Jurisdiction is a power introduced for the public good, on account of the necessity of administering justice. Quaelibet jurisdictio cancellos suos habet. Every jurisdiction has its own bounds. Qui habet jurisdictionem absolvendi, habet juuisdictionem ligandi. He who has jurisdiction to release, has jurisdiction to bind. Rerum ordo confunditur si unicuique jurisdictio non servetur. The order of things is confused if everyone does not give heed to his own jurissiction. Ubi est forum, ibi ergo est jus. Where the forum is, there the law is accordingly. Judici officium suum exceeenti non paretur. No obedience is to be given to a judge exceeding his office or jurisdiction. Est boni judicis ampliire jurisdictionem. It is the duty of a good judge to interrret his jurisdiction liberally. In personam actio est, qua cum eo agimus qui obligatus est nobis ad faciendum aliquid vel dandum. The action in personam is that in which we sue him who is under obligation to us to do something or give something. In omni actione ubi duae concurrunt districtiones, videlicet, in rem et in perronam, illa districtio tenenda est quae magis timetur et magis ligat. In every action where two distresses concur, that is to say, in rem and in personam, that is to be chosen which is most dreaded, and which binds more firmly. Cui jurisdictio data est, ea quoque concessa esse videntur, sine quibus jurisdictio explicari non potest. Those things without which jurisdiction could not be exercised are held to be given to each to whom jurisdiction has been granted. Debet quis juri subjacere ubi delinquit. Everyone ought to be subject to the law of the place where he commits an offense. Nihil habet forum ex scena. The court has nothingto do with what is not before it. Judicium a non suo judice datum nullius est momenti. A judgment rendered by one who is not the proper judge is of no force.
See also: administration, agency, ambit, area, authority, bailiwick, capacity, charge, circuit, control, custody, department, direction, domain, dominion, generalship, government, guidance, judicature, occupation, possession, power, predominance, primacy, province, realm, right, sphere, supervision, venue
Burton's Legal Thesaurus, 4E. Copyright © 2007 by William C. Burton. Used with permission of The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc.
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JURISDICTION, Practice. A power constitutionally conferred upon a judge or magistrate, to take cognizance of, and decide causes according to law, and to carry his sentence into execution. 6 Pet. 591; 9 John. 239. The tract of land or district within which a judge or magistrate has jurisdiction, is called his territory, and his power in relation to his territory is called his territorial jurisdiction.
2. Every act of jurisdiction exercised by a judge without his territory, either by pronouncing sentence or carrying it into execution, is null. An inferior court has no jurisdiction beyond what is expressly delegated. 1 Salk. 404, n.; Gilb. C. P. 188; 1 Saund. 73; 2 Lord Raym. 1311; and see Bac. Ab. Courts, &c., C, et seq; Bac. Ab. Pleas, E 2.
3. Jurisdiction is original, when it is conferred on the court in the first instance, which is called original jurisdiction; (q.v.) or it is appellate, which is when an appeal is given from the judgment of another court. Jurisdiction is also civil, where the subject-matter to be tried is not of a criminal nature; or criminal, where the court is to punish crimes. Some courts and magistrates have both civil and criminal jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is also concurrent, exclusive, or assistant. Concurrent jurisdiction is that which may be entertained by several courts. It is a rule that in cases of concurrent jurisdictions, that which is first seized of the case shall try it to the exclusion of the other. Exclusive jurisdiction is that which has alone the power to try or determine the Suit, action, or matter in dispute. assistant jurisdiction is that which is afforded by a court of chancery, in aid of a court of law; as, for example, by a bill of discovery, by the examination of witnesses de bene esse, or out of the jurisdiction of the court; by the perpetuation of the testimony of witnesses, and the like.
4. It is the law which gives jurisdiction; the consent of, parties, cannot, therefore, confer it, in a matter which the law excludes.
1 N. & M. 192; 3 M'Cord, 280; 1 Call. 55; 1 J. S. Marsh. 476; 1 Bibb, 263; Cooke, 27; Minor, 65; 3 Litt. 332; 6 Litt. 303; Kirby, 111; 1 Breese, 32; 2 Yerg. 441; 1 Const. R. 478. But where the court has jurisdiction of the matter, and the defendant has some privilege which exempts him from the jurisdiction, he may wave the privilege. 5 Cranch, 288; 1 Pet. 449; 8 Wheat. 699; 4 W. C. C. R. 84; 4 M'Cord, 79; 4 Mass. 593; Wright, 484. See Hardin, 448; 2 Wash. 213.
5. Courts of inferior jurisdiction must act within their jurisdiction, and so it must appear upon the record.
5 Cranch, 172 Pet. C. C. R. 36; 4 Dall. 11; 2 Mass. 213; 4 Mass. 122; 8 Mass. 86; 11 Mass. 513; Pr. Dec. 380; 2 Verm. 329; 3 Verm. 114; 10 Conn. 514; 4 John. 292; 3 Yerg. 355; Walker, 75; 9 Cowen, 227; 5 Har. & John. 36; 1 Bailey, 459; 2 Bailey, 267.
But the legislature may, by a general or special law, provide otherwise.
Pet. C. C. R. 36. Vide 1 Salk. 414; Bac. Ab. Courts, &c., C. D; Id. Prerogative, E 6; Merlin, Rep. h.t.; Ayl. Pat. 317,
and the art. Competency. As to the force of municipal law beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the state, see Wheat. Intern. Law, part a, c. 2, Sec. 7, et seq.; Story, Confl. of Laws, c. 2; Huberus, lib. 1, t. 3; 13 Mass. R. 4 Pard. Dr. Com. part. 6, t. 7, c. 2, Sec. 1; and the articles Conflict of Laws; Courts of the United States. See generally, Bouv. Inst. Index, h.t.
Monday, 19 November 2012
The Papal Curse
Original Article: "The Papal Curse" http://defendingcontending.com/2009/10/09/the-papal-curse/
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The anathema of the Pope, words that would strike moral terror in the hearts of men and women throughout time who lived under the tyranical rule of the self-professed Vicar of Christ. One who not only took upon himself the power to kill men in body, but one who also brazenly claimed the power to destroy men’s souls. Thereby in effect making himself equal with God (see Mt 10:28).
Below we will read the curse pronounced by Pope Pius IX upon Victor Emmanuel, where in Grover’s “Romanism The Danger Ahead”, it is written:
Victor Emmanuel and his patriotic countrymen wrested the temporal power from Pius IX., and liberated the Italian people from the power of the Church of Rome forever, so far as civil government is concerned. Being otherwise powerless, the pope strikes back, with a curse, which is here given, as printed in the Philadelphia Morning Post. It is the perfection of pious swearing by the Vicegerent of God, who said “swear not at all.” (1)
It is also said that this curse was pronounced on the Rev. Wm. Hogan, (a converted Roman Catholic priest), in Philadelphia. (2) One might also image that less explicit curses and anathemas as found in pronouncements from councils like Trent, carry with them the same underlying intent. {So when you read of the papal curses still on the books, which have never been revoked by Rome, keep these words in mind that flow forth from lips of the man who dresses like an angel but speaks like a dragon}.
Let us now read the words of the Pope:
“Pronounced on all who leave the Church of Rome. By the authority of God Almighty, the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, and the undefiled Virgin Mary, mother and patroness of our Saviour, and of all celestial virtues, Angels, Archangels, Thrones, Dominions, Powers, Cherubim and Seraphim, and of all the holy Patriarchs, Prophets, and of all the Apostles and Evangelists, of the holy innocents, who in the sight of the holy Lamb are found worthy to sing the new song of the Holy Martyrs and Holy Confessors, and of all the Holy Virgins, and of all the Saints, together with the Holy Elect of God,–MAY HE BE DAMNED. We excommunicate and anathematize him, from the threshold of the holy church of God Almighty. We sequester him, that he may be tormented, disposed, and be delivered over with Datham and Abiram, and with those who say unto the Lord, ‘Depart from us, we desire none of thy ways;’ as a fire is quenched with water, so let the light of him be put out forevermore, unless it shall repent him, and make satisfaction. Amen.
“May the Father who creates man, curse him. May the Son, who suffered for us, curse him! May the Holy Ghost who is poured out in baptism, curse him! May the Holy Cross, which Christ for our salvation, triumphing over his enemies, ascended, curse him!
“May the Holy Mary, ever Virgin and Mother of God, curse him! May all the Angels, Principalities, and Powers, and all heavenly Armies curse him! May the glorious band of the Patriarchs and Prophets curse him! “May St. John the Precursor, and St John the Baptist, and St. Peter and St Paul, and St. Andrew and all other of Christ’s Apostles together curse him and may the rest of the Disciples and Evangelists who by their preaching converted the universe, and the Holy and wonderful company of Martyrs and Confessors, who by their works are found pleasing to God Almighty; may the holy choir of the Holy Virgins, who for the honor of God have despised the things of the world, damn him.
May all the Saints from the beginning of the world to everlasting ages, who are found to be beloved of God, damn him!
“May he be damned wherever he be, whether in the house or in the alley, in the woods or in the water, or in the church! May he be cursed in living or dying!
“May he be cursed in eating and drinking, in being hungry, in being thirsty, in fasting and sleeping, in slumbering, and in sitting, in living, in working, in resting, and in blood letting! May he be cursed in all the faculties of his body!
“May he be cursed inwardly and outwardly. May he be cursed in his hair; cursed be he in his brains, and his vertex, in his temples, in his eyebrows, in his cheeks, in his jaw-bones, in his nostrils, in his teeth, and grinders, in his lips, in his shoulders, in his arms, and in his fingers.
“May he be damned in his mouth, in his breast, in his heart, and purtenances, down to the very stomach!
“May he be cursed in his reins and groins, in his thighs and his hips, and in his knees, his legs and his feet, and his toe-nails!
“May he be cursed in all his joints, and articulation of the members; from the crown of the head to the soles of his feet, may there be no soundness!
“May the Son of the living God, with all the glory of his majesty, CURSE HIM! And may Heaven, with all the powers that move therein, rise up against him, and curse and damn him; unless he repent and make satisfaction! Amen! So be it. Be it so. Amen.” (3)
===================================================================
The anathema of the Pope, words that would strike moral terror in the hearts of men and women throughout time who lived under the tyranical rule of the self-professed Vicar of Christ. One who not only took upon himself the power to kill men in body, but one who also brazenly claimed the power to destroy men’s souls. Thereby in effect making himself equal with God (see Mt 10:28). Below we will read the curse pronounced by Pope Pius IX upon Victor Emmanuel, where in Grover’s “Romanism The Danger Ahead”, it is written:
Victor Emmanuel and his patriotic countrymen wrested the temporal power from Pius IX., and liberated the Italian people from the power of the Church of Rome forever, so far as civil government is concerned. Being otherwise powerless, the pope strikes back, with a curse, which is here given, as printed in the Philadelphia Morning Post. It is the perfection of pious swearing by the Vicegerent of God, who said “swear not at all.” (1)
It is also said that this curse was pronounced on the Rev. Wm. Hogan, (a converted Roman Catholic priest), in Philadelphia. (2) One might also image that less explicit curses and anathemas as found in pronouncements from councils like Trent, carry with them the same underlying intent. {So when you read of the papal curses still on the books, which have never been revoked by Rome, keep these words in mind that flow forth from lips of the man who dresses like an angel but speaks like a dragon}.
Let us now read the words of the Pope:
“Pronounced on all who leave the Church of Rome. By the authority of God Almighty, the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, and the undefiled Virgin Mary, mother and patroness of our Saviour, and of all celestial virtues, Angels, Archangels, Thrones, Dominions, Powers, Cherubim and Seraphim, and of all the holy Patriarchs, Prophets, and of all the Apostles and Evangelists, of the holy innocents, who in the sight of the holy Lamb are found worthy to sing the new song of the Holy Martyrs and Holy Confessors, and of all the Holy Virgins, and of all the Saints, together with the Holy Elect of God,–MAY HE BE DAMNED. We excommunicate and anathematize him, from the threshold of the holy church of God Almighty. We sequester him, that he may be tormented, disposed, and be delivered over with Datham and Abiram, and with those who say unto the Lord, ‘Depart from us, we desire none of thy ways;’ as a fire is quenched with water, so let the light of him be put out forevermore, unless it shall repent him, and make satisfaction. Amen.
“May the Father who creates man, curse him. May the Son, who suffered for us, curse him! May the Holy Ghost who is poured out in baptism, curse him! May the Holy Cross, which Christ for our salvation, triumphing over his enemies, ascended, curse him!
“May the Holy Mary, ever Virgin and Mother of God, curse him! May all the Angels, Principalities, and Powers, and all heavenly Armies curse him! May the glorious band of the Patriarchs and Prophets curse him! “May St. John the Precursor, and St John the Baptist, and St. Peter and St Paul, and St. Andrew and all other of Christ’s Apostles together curse him and may the rest of the Disciples and Evangelists who by their preaching converted the universe, and the Holy and wonderful company of Martyrs and Confessors, who by their works are found pleasing to God Almighty; may the holy choir of the Holy Virgins, who for the honor of God have despised the things of the world, damn him.
May all the Saints from the beginning of the world to everlasting ages, who are found to be beloved of God, damn him!
“May he be damned wherever he be, whether in the house or in the alley, in the woods or in the water, or in the church! May he be cursed in living or dying!
“May he be cursed in eating and drinking, in being hungry, in being thirsty, in fasting and sleeping, in slumbering, and in sitting, in living, in working, in resting, and in blood letting! May he be cursed in all the faculties of his body!
“May he be cursed inwardly and outwardly. May he be cursed in his hair; cursed be he in his brains, and his vertex, in his temples, in his eyebrows, in his cheeks, in his jaw-bones, in his nostrils, in his teeth, and grinders, in his lips, in his shoulders, in his arms, and in his fingers.
“May he be damned in his mouth, in his breast, in his heart, and purtenances, down to the very stomach!
“May he be cursed in his reins and groins, in his thighs and his hips, and in his knees, his legs and his feet, and his toe-nails!
“May he be cursed in all his joints, and articulation of the members; from the crown of the head to the soles of his feet, may there be no soundness!
“May the Son of the living God, with all the glory of his majesty, CURSE HIM! And may Heaven, with all the powers that move therein, rise up against him, and curse and damn him; unless he repent and make satisfaction! Amen! So be it. Be it so. Amen.” (3)
Welsh rugby's papal curse backed by facts
Original Article "Welsh rugby's papal curse backed by facts" http://www.smh.com.au/rugby-union/union-news/welsh-rugbys-papal-curse-backed-by-facts-20120420-1xb20.html
===================================================================
An urban legend that says a pope dies whenever Wales wins Europe's rugby crown is gaining statistical ground, says a letter in the British Medical Journal (BMJ) today.
In 2008, a pair of Welsh doctors dug into the history books and discovered that of eight Roman Catholic pontiffs who had died since 1883, five expired in a year when Wales won the Grand Slam.
The Grand Slam is awarded to the team that defeats allcomers in the competition gathering the four rugby-playing nations of the British Isles plus France and, since 2000, Italy.
"Every time Wales wins the Rugby Grand Slam, a Pope dies, except for 1978, when Wales was really good and two Popes died," the researchers said, quoting a Welsh saying.
The jinx endures, the BMJ letter points out.
It says that the "research" should include Coptic popes, whose lineage dates back to Mark the Evangelist.
"This year saw the death of the Coptic pope, Shenouda III, on the very day that Wales won the grand slam," notes Edward Snelson, a paediatrician at the Sheffield Children's Hospital in the northern English county of Yorkshire.
Tongue firmly in cheek, Snelson adds: "Although the association between these deaths and the sporting events may not be fully understood, this research has created a false reassurance and may be putting the lives of other popes at risk."
"He was pope for 41 years and succeeded Cyril VI, who died in 1971, in the same month that Wales won the Grand Slam again."
His Holiness Pope Shenouda III, the 117th Pope of the
Coptic Orthodox Church died on the same day as Wales won the Grand Slam
in March. Photo: Reuters
===================================================================
An urban legend that says a pope dies whenever Wales wins Europe's rugby crown is gaining statistical ground, says a letter in the British Medical Journal (BMJ) today.
In 2008, a pair of Welsh doctors dug into the history books and discovered that of eight Roman Catholic pontiffs who had died since 1883, five expired in a year when Wales won the Grand Slam.
The Grand Slam is awarded to the team that defeats allcomers in the competition gathering the four rugby-playing nations of the British Isles plus France and, since 2000, Italy.
"Every time Wales wins the Rugby Grand Slam, a Pope dies, except for 1978, when Wales was really good and two Popes died," the researchers said, quoting a Welsh saying.
The jinx endures, the BMJ letter points out.
It says that the "research" should include Coptic popes, whose lineage dates back to Mark the Evangelist.
"This year saw the death of the Coptic pope, Shenouda III, on the very day that Wales won the grand slam," notes Edward Snelson, a paediatrician at the Sheffield Children's Hospital in the northern English county of Yorkshire.
Tongue firmly in cheek, Snelson adds: "Although the association between these deaths and the sporting events may not be fully understood, this research has created a false reassurance and may be putting the lives of other popes at risk."
"He was pope for 41 years and succeeded Cyril VI, who died in 1971, in the same month that Wales won the Grand Slam again."
Sunday, 18 November 2012
Court Case: UNITED STATES v. FRENCH
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Sheila FRENCH, Defendant. William Dixon Lunn, Attorney-Appellant.
No. 07-5147.
-- February 24, 2009
Before BRISCOE, PORFILIO, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.
Submitted on the brief: *William D. Lunn, Tulsa, OK, Attorney-Appellant.
William Lunn, who was appointed under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA), 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, to represent Sheila French, submitted a voucher under the CJA for compensation and reimbursement of expenses incurred in representing Ms. French in resentencing proceedings. The district court approved payment in an. amount significantly less than Mr. Lunn requested. He now seeks review of the district court's decision regarding his CJA compensation. We conclude that we are without jurisdiction to consider this appeal, and dismiss this appeal.
Ms. French was convicted on drug-related charges and sentenced to a term of imprisonment. She appealed her sentence, and this court reversed and remanded for resentencing in light of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), and for correction of an error in the drug-weight calculation. Mr. Lunn represented Ms. French on remand in the district court resentencing proceedings, which included two hearings and six briefs filed by Mr. Lunn (four of which were filed at the request of the district court). After the resentencing, Mr. Lunn submitted a CJA voucher requesting reimbursement of expenses and compensation in excess of the statutory maximum, for a total amount of $7,420.75. A magistrate judge reviewed the voucher request and recommended to the district court that the voucher be paid as requested. In making his recommendation, the magistrate judge found that the case had previously been characterized by the court as “complex” (based in part on the sentencing issues) and that the sentencing issues on remand remained complex. He noted that the compensation request was unusually high, but that on close review and in light of the shifting sentencing landscape, compensation in excess of the statutory maximum was necessary to fairly compensate counsel.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(3) (statutory maximum may be waived in complex or extended cases where court certifies that it is necessary for fair compensation). Finally, after detailed consideration, the magistrate judge found that the expenses should be reimbursed and that the compensation requested was reasonable and necessary.
The district court disagreed with the magistrate judge's recommendations and declined to adopt them. Instead, the district court found that Mr. Lunn's representation on resentencing was neither extended nor complex, and that he could be fairly compensated for his services within the statutory maximum.
Consequently, the district court declined to certify the proceedings so as to exceed the statutory maximum; it authorized the then-statutory maximum compensation of $1,500 and reimbursement of expenses. Mr. Lunn appeals that order, arguing that this court has jurisdiction to consider whether a district court's denial of “virtually all” of a CJA compensation request is proper.
Aplt. Br. at 22. He also claims the district court erred in refusing to certify his compensation request for payment in excess of the statutory maximum and that the compensation he received was not reasonable.
Every circuit court of appeals to consider this jurisdictional question has held that CJA fee compensation determinations made by the district court are not appealable. United States v. Stone, 53 F.3d 141, 143 (6th Cir.1995); Shearin v. United States, 992 F.2d 1195, 1196 (Fed.Cir.1993); Landano v. Rafferty, 859 F.2d 301, 302 (3rd Cir.1988); United States v. Rodriguez, 833 F.2d 1536,1537-38 (11th Cir.1987); United States v. Walton (In re Baker), 693 F.2d 925, 927 (9th Cir.1982); United States v. Smith, 633 F.2d 739, 742 (7th Cir.1980); cf. United States v. Bloomer, 150 F.3d 146, 148 (2d Cir.1998) (holding that orders concerning fee determinations for services already rendered under the CJA are not appealable). 1 Our circuit has come to the same conclusion, albeit in dicta: “Fee determinations by the district judge pursuant to the [CJA] are administrative in character and do not constitute final appealable orders within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.” United States v. Davis, 953 F.2d 1482, 1497 n. 21 (10th Cir.1992). We now join the other circuits that have reached the question and hold that district court CJA fee determinations are not appealable orders. As the Sixth Circuit stated, the CJA does not provide for appellate review of a fee determination; instead, the district court has complete discretion, subject only to minimal review by the chief judge of the circuit. Stone, 53 F.3d at 143. In addition, the non-adversarial nature of the process supports the conclusion that it is an administrative act, as opposed to a judicial decision. Id.; Rodriguez, 833 F.2d at 1537-38; In re Baker, 693 F.2d at 926-27.
Mr. Lunn recognizes the weight of the circuit authority, but argues that his dispute is reviewable because it is analogous to the situation in Davis. In that case, the district court had completely neglected its duty to review the CJA vouchers and forward them for payment, and counsel asked us to order the district court to fulfill its duty to process the interim voucher. After recognizing the general consensus among the circuits that orders concerning CJA fee determinations were not appealable, we stated that the situation then before us was “fundamentally different from claims concerning the amount of payment.” Davis, 953 F.2d at 1497 n. 21. Mr. Lunn argues that, as in Davis, his situation is also fundamentally different from claims concerning the amount of payment. He characterizes the request in Davis as one “not to be denied reasonable payments for [counsel's] services by interim payments,” just as he is requesting reasonable payment for his service. Aplt. Br. at 24.
However, Mr. Lunn's situation is different than that presented in Davis. The district court in Davis, contrary to the process prescribed by the CJA and the court's own order regarding processing of interim vouchers, had taken no action whatsoever on counsel's interim vouchers-it had not reviewed the vouchers, authorized compensation, or submitted them to the chief judge for review and approval. What made the Davis situation fundamentally different from a claim concerning the amount of payment was that the district court had not taken action to process the interim vouchers at all. In Mr. Lunn's case, the district court fulfilled its administrative duty to review Mr. Lunn's voucher and forward it for payment. Notwithstanding Mr. Lunn's attempt to characterize his dispute as about the process by which the district court arrived at its conclusion, and regardless of the fact that he disagrees with the district court's analysis and conclusions regarding whether the resentencing proceedings were complex and whether exceeding the statutory maximum was necessary for fair compensation under the CJA, it all comes down to the fact that Mr. Lunn disagrees with the amount of the payment.
Mr. Lunn also argues that we have jurisdiction in this case based on the collateral order doctrine announced in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528, (1949). We agree with the Sixth and the Ninth Circuits that the district court decision concerning the amount of CJA fees does not come within the collateral order doctrine for the same reason that it is not an appealable order within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291-it is a decision that is administrative, not judicial, in nature. See Stone, 53 F.3d at 143; In re Baker, 693 F.2d at 926-27. Just as its administrative nature prevents it from being an appealable order under § 1291, neither is it a judicial, interlocutory order subject to the collateral order doctrine. Stone, 53 F.3d at 143.
Mr. Lunn relies on the decision in United States v. Poland (In re Derickson), 640 F.2d 946, 947-48 (9th Cir.1981), to support his argument that the collateral order doctrine provides a jurisdictional basis for this appeal. That decision, however, does not further Mr. Lunn's cause. That case involved an appeal from a district court decision that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider counsel's CJA voucher because the voucher was not submitted for review within the administrative time limit. By its own terms, that case is distinguishable:
This appeal involves the district court's determination that it lacked jurisdiction to consider an untimely voucher for attorney's fees.
We are not called upon to consider whether amounts awarded, methods of computation, or like matters related to attorney's fees under the CJA are appealable.
Id. at 948. In fact, in a later Ninth Circuit decision holding that a district court decision approving CJA fees in an amount less than requested by counsel was not appealable, the court noted its decision in In re Derickson as “expressly point[ing] out that we were not called upon to decide whether the certification of an actual amount was appealable.” In re Baker, 693 F.2d at 925-26 & n. 1. In re Derickson presented a different jurisdictional question than is presented here, and the Ninth Circuit has since held that district court orders “establishing the amount of attorneys fees under the [CJA] are not appealable.” In re Baker, 693 F.2d at 926.
The third issue raised by Mr. Lunn is that the compensation authorized by the district court was unreasonable. This claim also goes to the amount of the district court's fee determination, and, as such, is not appealable.
The appeal is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
FOOTNOTES
1. Two circuits have reviewed CJA compensation decisions without discussing jurisdiction. See United States v. Turner, 584 F.2d 1389 (8th Cir.1978); United States v. Ketchem, 420 F.2d 901 (4th Cir.1969).
BRISCOE, Circuit Judge.
No. 07-5147.
-- February 24, 2009
Before BRISCOE, PORFILIO, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.
Submitted on the brief: *William D. Lunn, Tulsa, OK, Attorney-Appellant.
William Lunn, who was appointed under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA), 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, to represent Sheila French, submitted a voucher under the CJA for compensation and reimbursement of expenses incurred in representing Ms. French in resentencing proceedings. The district court approved payment in an. amount significantly less than Mr. Lunn requested. He now seeks review of the district court's decision regarding his CJA compensation. We conclude that we are without jurisdiction to consider this appeal, and dismiss this appeal.
Ms. French was convicted on drug-related charges and sentenced to a term of imprisonment. She appealed her sentence, and this court reversed and remanded for resentencing in light of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), and for correction of an error in the drug-weight calculation. Mr. Lunn represented Ms. French on remand in the district court resentencing proceedings, which included two hearings and six briefs filed by Mr. Lunn (four of which were filed at the request of the district court). After the resentencing, Mr. Lunn submitted a CJA voucher requesting reimbursement of expenses and compensation in excess of the statutory maximum, for a total amount of $7,420.75. A magistrate judge reviewed the voucher request and recommended to the district court that the voucher be paid as requested. In making his recommendation, the magistrate judge found that the case had previously been characterized by the court as “complex” (based in part on the sentencing issues) and that the sentencing issues on remand remained complex. He noted that the compensation request was unusually high, but that on close review and in light of the shifting sentencing landscape, compensation in excess of the statutory maximum was necessary to fairly compensate counsel.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(3) (statutory maximum may be waived in complex or extended cases where court certifies that it is necessary for fair compensation). Finally, after detailed consideration, the magistrate judge found that the expenses should be reimbursed and that the compensation requested was reasonable and necessary.
The district court disagreed with the magistrate judge's recommendations and declined to adopt them. Instead, the district court found that Mr. Lunn's representation on resentencing was neither extended nor complex, and that he could be fairly compensated for his services within the statutory maximum.
Consequently, the district court declined to certify the proceedings so as to exceed the statutory maximum; it authorized the then-statutory maximum compensation of $1,500 and reimbursement of expenses. Mr. Lunn appeals that order, arguing that this court has jurisdiction to consider whether a district court's denial of “virtually all” of a CJA compensation request is proper.
Aplt. Br. at 22. He also claims the district court erred in refusing to certify his compensation request for payment in excess of the statutory maximum and that the compensation he received was not reasonable.
Every circuit court of appeals to consider this jurisdictional question has held that CJA fee compensation determinations made by the district court are not appealable. United States v. Stone, 53 F.3d 141, 143 (6th Cir.1995); Shearin v. United States, 992 F.2d 1195, 1196 (Fed.Cir.1993); Landano v. Rafferty, 859 F.2d 301, 302 (3rd Cir.1988); United States v. Rodriguez, 833 F.2d 1536,1537-38 (11th Cir.1987); United States v. Walton (In re Baker), 693 F.2d 925, 927 (9th Cir.1982); United States v. Smith, 633 F.2d 739, 742 (7th Cir.1980); cf. United States v. Bloomer, 150 F.3d 146, 148 (2d Cir.1998) (holding that orders concerning fee determinations for services already rendered under the CJA are not appealable). 1 Our circuit has come to the same conclusion, albeit in dicta: “Fee determinations by the district judge pursuant to the [CJA] are administrative in character and do not constitute final appealable orders within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.” United States v. Davis, 953 F.2d 1482, 1497 n. 21 (10th Cir.1992). We now join the other circuits that have reached the question and hold that district court CJA fee determinations are not appealable orders. As the Sixth Circuit stated, the CJA does not provide for appellate review of a fee determination; instead, the district court has complete discretion, subject only to minimal review by the chief judge of the circuit. Stone, 53 F.3d at 143. In addition, the non-adversarial nature of the process supports the conclusion that it is an administrative act, as opposed to a judicial decision. Id.; Rodriguez, 833 F.2d at 1537-38; In re Baker, 693 F.2d at 926-27.
Mr. Lunn recognizes the weight of the circuit authority, but argues that his dispute is reviewable because it is analogous to the situation in Davis. In that case, the district court had completely neglected its duty to review the CJA vouchers and forward them for payment, and counsel asked us to order the district court to fulfill its duty to process the interim voucher. After recognizing the general consensus among the circuits that orders concerning CJA fee determinations were not appealable, we stated that the situation then before us was “fundamentally different from claims concerning the amount of payment.” Davis, 953 F.2d at 1497 n. 21. Mr. Lunn argues that, as in Davis, his situation is also fundamentally different from claims concerning the amount of payment. He characterizes the request in Davis as one “not to be denied reasonable payments for [counsel's] services by interim payments,” just as he is requesting reasonable payment for his service. Aplt. Br. at 24.
However, Mr. Lunn's situation is different than that presented in Davis. The district court in Davis, contrary to the process prescribed by the CJA and the court's own order regarding processing of interim vouchers, had taken no action whatsoever on counsel's interim vouchers-it had not reviewed the vouchers, authorized compensation, or submitted them to the chief judge for review and approval. What made the Davis situation fundamentally different from a claim concerning the amount of payment was that the district court had not taken action to process the interim vouchers at all. In Mr. Lunn's case, the district court fulfilled its administrative duty to review Mr. Lunn's voucher and forward it for payment. Notwithstanding Mr. Lunn's attempt to characterize his dispute as about the process by which the district court arrived at its conclusion, and regardless of the fact that he disagrees with the district court's analysis and conclusions regarding whether the resentencing proceedings were complex and whether exceeding the statutory maximum was necessary for fair compensation under the CJA, it all comes down to the fact that Mr. Lunn disagrees with the amount of the payment.
Mr. Lunn also argues that we have jurisdiction in this case based on the collateral order doctrine announced in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528, (1949). We agree with the Sixth and the Ninth Circuits that the district court decision concerning the amount of CJA fees does not come within the collateral order doctrine for the same reason that it is not an appealable order within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291-it is a decision that is administrative, not judicial, in nature. See Stone, 53 F.3d at 143; In re Baker, 693 F.2d at 926-27. Just as its administrative nature prevents it from being an appealable order under § 1291, neither is it a judicial, interlocutory order subject to the collateral order doctrine. Stone, 53 F.3d at 143.
Mr. Lunn relies on the decision in United States v. Poland (In re Derickson), 640 F.2d 946, 947-48 (9th Cir.1981), to support his argument that the collateral order doctrine provides a jurisdictional basis for this appeal. That decision, however, does not further Mr. Lunn's cause. That case involved an appeal from a district court decision that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider counsel's CJA voucher because the voucher was not submitted for review within the administrative time limit. By its own terms, that case is distinguishable:
This appeal involves the district court's determination that it lacked jurisdiction to consider an untimely voucher for attorney's fees.
We are not called upon to consider whether amounts awarded, methods of computation, or like matters related to attorney's fees under the CJA are appealable.
Id. at 948. In fact, in a later Ninth Circuit decision holding that a district court decision approving CJA fees in an amount less than requested by counsel was not appealable, the court noted its decision in In re Derickson as “expressly point[ing] out that we were not called upon to decide whether the certification of an actual amount was appealable.” In re Baker, 693 F.2d at 925-26 & n. 1. In re Derickson presented a different jurisdictional question than is presented here, and the Ninth Circuit has since held that district court orders “establishing the amount of attorneys fees under the [CJA] are not appealable.” In re Baker, 693 F.2d at 926.
The third issue raised by Mr. Lunn is that the compensation authorized by the district court was unreasonable. This claim also goes to the amount of the district court's fee determination, and, as such, is not appealable.
The appeal is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
FOOTNOTES
1. Two circuits have reviewed CJA compensation decisions without discussing jurisdiction. See United States v. Turner, 584 F.2d 1389 (8th Cir.1978); United States v. Ketchem, 420 F.2d 901 (4th Cir.1969).
BRISCOE, Circuit Judge.
Tuesday, 13 November 2012
The Great Secret Of Royals
Original Article " http://www.angelfire.com/wi/famtree/sec-roy.html " with a little bit of changes by myself, to try make it simple.
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Real, flesh and blood man=True. Or FICTION-ENTITY=False
Real Man cannot create Real Man=Real is Real.
Real Man creating paper=Paper Man.
Paper Man creating paper=Paper Man=False.
COMMERSE/Paper Authority (Man)=False.
=========================================
Shall a man make gods (Paper Authority) unto himself and they (are) no gods?" This should be read; "Shall a man make gods (Paper Authority) FOR himself and there are no gods (Paper Authority)?" This says that the person who is making "gods" is no god (in reality). A question is then inferred from this and that is; then why make the gods (Paper Authority)?
==========================================
This says that "they" are no gods, but means "there are" no gods.
Not because this is a translation or even a mere "interpretation" of the statement - no, it "means" this because when one knows the full truth about all of this FIRST that one is then able to DEDUCE the "inferred" meaning.
Once you realize that one royal family via its various branches were the creators of virtually all known gods and religions - then you know the deeper truths about this, which one discovers and that is that they (the royals) were in the "god"/religion business, but that it was still even much more than that - you also learn that for royals
to even have existed they first had to create "gods" to ordain them {breaking this down, means that paper created paper}. Where is the real GOD here?
That is, to "authorize" them as select representatives of those "gods" {breaking this down, means that the royals have power over their work people or paper}. Not the Real PEOPLE.
Yes, creating gods and religions was a means of establishing and creating "authority" for royals {breaking this down, means that the paper creations gives them authority and not GOD} in order for them to rule in the first place. They were "ordained" by the very gods (Paper Authority) that they created! That was the real and original reason and purpose for the creation of gods (by royals), to BE that facilitation that creates royalty itself.
Funny how this reminds one of the phrase "to BE, or NOT to BE" {breaking this down, means what is real and was is not}. In this instance, that would mean either they DID this in order to BE royalty, or they would NOT be royalty. That, in their minds would BE the question!
"Gods" were the higher and mysterious power that gave orders to the masses instructing them to accept one person or other and/or their family members as the ones who would be "in charge" and be the leaders of the masses - they, the "chosen" (of the created god/s) {breaking this down, means which were created themself, but by man or GOD}.
were the representatives of "god" on Earth {breaking this down means, paper ruling the earth}. And that is how all of this truly and logically worked. This is the real truth about gods and royalty. This should have been figured out long, long ago.
To restate this, there could have been no royalty without a god or gods to ordain them as such. And so, those who sought to control others and gain power over them created ‘gods’ to facilitate that. So, what came first the royals or the gods? The very first time it had to be that there were ordinary persons who sought to be "royal" in order to gain control over a group of persons and then a god or gods were created by them in order to achieve that.
However, after having had this work, this particular family then worked on refining this. And so, afterwards it was the royals who were creating gods for various branches of this family so that rulers could be "ordained" in other countries as well. This family learned a lot from what they were able to accomplish by this. They well knew that knowledge was the key to their being able to manipulate the masses, or as we are used to hearing it;
"knowledge is power".
They, these "god creators" know what things to do in order to maintain/retain their power and control over the masses. They knew that for themselves to maintain a high level of knowledge and information was to keep what they already had and to even more, and so, "dumbing down" the masses was a large part of this. So, they invented superstitions and other misleading items so that the masses would preoccupy themselves with trivial matters and be distracted from ‘real’ things or things of real consequence to them in their lives.
The poor, mistreated and thoroughly manipulated masses were kept in perpetual ignorance by these rulers - and were ‘played’ like musical instruments by master musicians. The royals from the very beginning of the time when they first discovered how to BE royals, were busy figuring out how they could keep this good thing going for as long as possible. And a part of that included keeping records of their observances of the skies (called "heavens" by them).
They knew when solar and lunar eclipses would occur.
And this knowledge was used as a very powerful tool to convince the masses that "god" was giving them a ‘sign’.
Can you imagine who those poor and dumb subjects would have acted when seeing such a thing happening? The manipulators (the royals) could have asked for ANYTHING and got it from each and every one of those poor fools who were under their control. Today, we see this same thing being continued. Only instead of "royals", it is those who have the "knowledge" and who are using it to gain their "good life" off of the backs of "believers".
They do things that most of us never think of and that most of us as good persons would NOT do to other human beings - yet, they are praised by the very persons whom they are scamming! They are televangelists and preachers in large churches, they are in positions of authority within those very familiar "organized" religions.
And what is it that they do? They get their "titles" from the masses, which is really millions and millions of dollars annually for each of these churches and preachers. And, on top of that churches do NOT pay property tax. And eventually, each and every ‘believer’ will die. And guess what? A great many of these ‘believers’ will leave their money and property to "the church". That is millions and millions of dollars worth of personal property and homes, jewels and jewelry, etc. People complain of "rip-offs", but get angry with you if you try to explain to them that they are being ripped off by the church! And if I were a child of a person who would have something to leave to me and instead found out that all that my parent had worked hard to obtain in their lifetime was left to the church instead of me, I’d be angry!
The truth of the matter is that all of this could go directly to the church with very few persons even being aware of it. You, as a child of someone who had their life’s work to leave to you, may NEVER even know WHERE all of that personal wealth had went! And, chances are that if YOU are a believer, that very same thing may happen to you and your child or children will have the same thing happen to them too in this ‘cycle’.
We are not just talking about money or real estate property either.
We are talking about ANYTHING that one can leave to others upon death. We are talking about art, patents, research secrets, little known information, rare books, family heirlooms, archaeological finds, gold, silver, rare coins, and on and on. All of this piled up on top of another pile of wealth times millions - all going to "the church" in a continual cycle year after year for all of these years! Can there BE any bigger scam???
When you get to a certain point where you have gained a large amount of knowledge about all of this - all you will need are "inferences" which may be found in ancient texts in order to understand what is really "meant" when things are stated in them.
The reason being is that you will pretty much have already figured out what is being inferred and all that the inference would do is to further substantiate your conclusions. Those inferences would be like so much "supplemental" knowledge or information to what you already know anyway.
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Real, flesh and blood man=True. Or FICTION-ENTITY=False
Two Worlds
GOD/Sovereign Man=REAL.Real Man cannot create Real Man=Real is Real.
Real Man creating paper=Paper Man.
Paper Man creating paper=Paper Man=False.
COMMERSE/Paper Authority (Man)=False.
=========================================
Shall a man make gods (Paper Authority) unto himself and they (are) no gods?" This should be read; "Shall a man make gods (Paper Authority) FOR himself and there are no gods (Paper Authority)?" This says that the person who is making "gods" is no god (in reality). A question is then inferred from this and that is; then why make the gods (Paper Authority)?
==========================================
This says that "they" are no gods, but means "there are" no gods.
Not because this is a translation or even a mere "interpretation" of the statement - no, it "means" this because when one knows the full truth about all of this FIRST that one is then able to DEDUCE the "inferred" meaning.
Once you realize that one royal family via its various branches were the creators of virtually all known gods and religions - then you know the deeper truths about this, which one discovers and that is that they (the royals) were in the "god"/religion business, but that it was still even much more than that - you also learn that for royals
to even have existed they first had to create "gods" to ordain them {breaking this down, means that paper created paper}. Where is the real GOD here?
That is, to "authorize" them as select representatives of those "gods" {breaking this down, means that the royals have power over their work people or paper}. Not the Real PEOPLE.
Yes, creating gods and religions was a means of establishing and creating "authority" for royals {breaking this down, means that the paper creations gives them authority and not GOD} in order for them to rule in the first place. They were "ordained" by the very gods (Paper Authority) that they created! That was the real and original reason and purpose for the creation of gods (by royals), to BE that facilitation that creates royalty itself.
Funny how this reminds one of the phrase "to BE, or NOT to BE" {breaking this down, means what is real and was is not}. In this instance, that would mean either they DID this in order to BE royalty, or they would NOT be royalty. That, in their minds would BE the question!
"Gods" were the higher and mysterious power that gave orders to the masses instructing them to accept one person or other and/or their family members as the ones who would be "in charge" and be the leaders of the masses - they, the "chosen" (of the created god/s) {breaking this down, means which were created themself, but by man or GOD}.
were the representatives of "god" on Earth {breaking this down means, paper ruling the earth}. And that is how all of this truly and logically worked. This is the real truth about gods and royalty. This should have been figured out long, long ago.
To restate this, there could have been no royalty without a god or gods to ordain them as such. And so, those who sought to control others and gain power over them created ‘gods’ to facilitate that. So, what came first the royals or the gods? The very first time it had to be that there were ordinary persons who sought to be "royal" in order to gain control over a group of persons and then a god or gods were created by them in order to achieve that.
However, after having had this work, this particular family then worked on refining this. And so, afterwards it was the royals who were creating gods for various branches of this family so that rulers could be "ordained" in other countries as well. This family learned a lot from what they were able to accomplish by this. They well knew that knowledge was the key to their being able to manipulate the masses, or as we are used to hearing it;
"knowledge is power".
They, these "god creators" know what things to do in order to maintain/retain their power and control over the masses. They knew that for themselves to maintain a high level of knowledge and information was to keep what they already had and to even more, and so, "dumbing down" the masses was a large part of this. So, they invented superstitions and other misleading items so that the masses would preoccupy themselves with trivial matters and be distracted from ‘real’ things or things of real consequence to them in their lives.
The poor, mistreated and thoroughly manipulated masses were kept in perpetual ignorance by these rulers - and were ‘played’ like musical instruments by master musicians. The royals from the very beginning of the time when they first discovered how to BE royals, were busy figuring out how they could keep this good thing going for as long as possible. And a part of that included keeping records of their observances of the skies (called "heavens" by them).
They knew when solar and lunar eclipses would occur.
And this knowledge was used as a very powerful tool to convince the masses that "god" was giving them a ‘sign’.
Can you imagine who those poor and dumb subjects would have acted when seeing such a thing happening? The manipulators (the royals) could have asked for ANYTHING and got it from each and every one of those poor fools who were under their control. Today, we see this same thing being continued. Only instead of "royals", it is those who have the "knowledge" and who are using it to gain their "good life" off of the backs of "believers".
They do things that most of us never think of and that most of us as good persons would NOT do to other human beings - yet, they are praised by the very persons whom they are scamming! They are televangelists and preachers in large churches, they are in positions of authority within those very familiar "organized" religions.
And what is it that they do? They get their "titles" from the masses, which is really millions and millions of dollars annually for each of these churches and preachers. And, on top of that churches do NOT pay property tax. And eventually, each and every ‘believer’ will die. And guess what? A great many of these ‘believers’ will leave their money and property to "the church". That is millions and millions of dollars worth of personal property and homes, jewels and jewelry, etc. People complain of "rip-offs", but get angry with you if you try to explain to them that they are being ripped off by the church! And if I were a child of a person who would have something to leave to me and instead found out that all that my parent had worked hard to obtain in their lifetime was left to the church instead of me, I’d be angry!
The truth of the matter is that all of this could go directly to the church with very few persons even being aware of it. You, as a child of someone who had their life’s work to leave to you, may NEVER even know WHERE all of that personal wealth had went! And, chances are that if YOU are a believer, that very same thing may happen to you and your child or children will have the same thing happen to them too in this ‘cycle’.
We are not just talking about money or real estate property either.
We are talking about ANYTHING that one can leave to others upon death. We are talking about art, patents, research secrets, little known information, rare books, family heirlooms, archaeological finds, gold, silver, rare coins, and on and on. All of this piled up on top of another pile of wealth times millions - all going to "the church" in a continual cycle year after year for all of these years! Can there BE any bigger scam???
When you get to a certain point where you have gained a large amount of knowledge about all of this - all you will need are "inferences" which may be found in ancient texts in order to understand what is really "meant" when things are stated in them.
The reason being is that you will pretty much have already figured out what is being inferred and all that the inference would do is to further substantiate your conclusions. Those inferences would be like so much "supplemental" knowledge or information to what you already know anyway.
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